Symbolic Attack Sites and the Performance of Terrorism, Counter Terrorism and Memory

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Abstract
This paper reports on a project that explores how terrorist attack sites become communicative platforms within which three kinds of enactment- the terrorist attack, counter measures by the state and affective public responses- construct narratives and counter narratives about terrorism. This approach is applied in research project that explores the range of meanings that emerge around the site of the 2002 Bali Bombings in Kuta, the political nature of commemoration and the ways in which victims voices become part of the narrative/counter narrative of violent extremism. The conceptual framework applied in this research incorporates performance theory and notions of the audience (government and publics) as narrators in a discourse of contested meanings that are also enacted through the symbolic imagery of the attack site. The findings reported here demonstrate how attack sites become dynamic spaces for the interpretation and reinterpretation of meanings about terrorism embodied in the narratives generated by the performance roles of various actors. These meanings challenge the performative power of the terrorist attacks but also construct counter narratives to official responses to terrorism.

Keywords: performance, terrorism, Bali bombings, communication.

Introduction
The Monday October 14 edition of the Jakarta Post’s Bali Daily featured a front page article in which Bali Deputy Governor Ketut Sudikerta addressed the congregation at the commemoration of the 11th Anniversary of the 2002 Bali bombings held in the Memorial Garden at the Australian Consulate-General office in Denpasar. “This commemoration will raise our awareness of similar potential dangers.” He stated, “We learned from the tragedy that we should prioritize our security system” (Erviani 2013). The politicisation of the commemorations as a reminder of the ongoing threat to security may not align well with the narrative of commemoration and remembrance, but it draws attention to the inextricable link between terrorism, counter-terrorism by the State (in all its manifestations) and public responses performed through rituals of memorialisation. This paper presents a conceptual framework that applies notions of performance and performativity to examine how terrorist attack sites become communicative platforms within which three kinds of enactment- the terrorist attack, counter measures by the state and affective public responses- construct narratives and counter narratives about terrorism. As such, this paper relies on conceptualisations of terrorism as choreographed performance directed not at the actual victims but at a broader audience of spectators, witnesses and victim populations. It also argues for the importance of studying terrorist attack sites as
theatres of performance that carry symbolic meaning both as the targets of destruction and as spaces for the constant reinterpretation of individual and collective perceptions of terrorism. This approach is applied in a three year research project, now in its second year, that follows attempts by the Australian based Bali Peace Park Association Inc. to acquire the land of the site of the former Sari Club where 88 Australians perished in the dual bomb attacks in Kuta in 2002. The project explores the range of meanings- often contested- that emerge around the attack site and the ways in which victims voices become part of the narrative/counter narrative of violent extremism. Terrorist attack sites are often recognised for their symbolic significance through which the terrorist attack generates its performative power. The conceptual framework presented in this paper calls for an application of performance theory that incorporates notions of the audience (government and publics) as narrators in a discourse of contested meanings that are also enacted through the symbolic imagery of the attack site.

Performance has been used as an organising concept in the social science disciplines to understand how individual and collective actions communicate constructs of self, experience and world views. Turner describes performance as social or cultural drama that encompasses several levels of cultural behaviour from everyday communicative acts to public ritual and theatre. Performance and performativity have also been applied to analyses of terrorism and counter terrorism, most notably as concepts for understanding the communicative functions of terrorism and counter terrorism for both the terrorists themselves and the audiences they seek to mobilise or affect.

Much of the scholarly contribution to performance and terrorism has come from outside the academic disciplines traditionally associated with terrorism studies. These contributions emerge out of interests in symbolic communication, the discursive construction of terrorism, witnessing terror, collective responses to terrorism and its affects. Within this space, notions of performance and performativity offer a way to move beyond the construction of acts of terror as ahistorical and disconnected from the social realities of everyday lives. Adler(2010) attempts to redefine the strategy of conflict by focussing attention on social power: individual and collective capacity to construct social reality. For Adler the symbolic significance and the capacity to control the ways in which this significance is perceived are central for the performative power of terrorism: “when actors project particular cultural meanings to public audiences in pursuit of instrumental goals or common understandings, they are engaged in contests about narratives, norms of appropriate behaviour, the legitimacy of goals and demands, and the definition of cooperation versus defection and of victory versus defeat” (p. 204).

Understanding terrorism through the framework of performance and performativity necessarily shifts attention away from strategic or material goals of terrorism, definitions, root causes and individual mindsets that have dominated the field of terrorism studies and focusses instead on the ways in which terrorist acts attempt to indirectly influence strategy by making a symbolic statement. Terrorism is about perception. For this very reason, it is the way the act is perceived and constructed- the meanings that are given to the act- that are all important. The performative power of terrorism relies on the capacity of the act to generate constructions of meaning that align with or prefer the terrorists’ intended meanings and, indirectly, achieve the terrorists’ strategic goals. These meanings are also part of the performance and are enacted through the counter measures adopted by the state and the affective responses adopted by the public. In this sense, performance also draws necessary attention to the
audience - those members of publics who receive, perceive and make sense of meanings.

The performative power of terrorism

The performance of terrorism expresses, through violence, an image of the world that terrorists want to communicate to an audience: it enacts imagery. At the same time it is also a reflective, inner enactment or performance that is experienced, though not necessarily expressed to the public. In this sense, terrorism is both outwardly and inwardly performative. It communicates an imagining of the world to a public (often an international audience) and an experience of the world to the terrorist himself or herself. It is not just the outward expression of imagery - by projecting to an audience an imagery of the world that the terrorists want us to see - but also the inward experience of imagery from which terrorism derives its performative power. By enacting terrorism, the terrorist actor is not communicating with one audience, but rather several audiences some of which are identifiable and corporeal: the immediate victim, the resonant mass, the government, the collective mass (Aly 2009) and some of which are intangible and ethereal: the self and the deity.

Performances elicit valuations and evaluations of images that are vested in experience and emotion. Both performers and their audiences bring to the performance the affective accumulation of experiences and understandings through which the performance is understood and analysed. Previous and socially constructed experiences of emotions prescribe how a performance will be symbolically constructed. For example, the ideal model of romantic love prescribes that love is experienced through physical acts that signify affection. Feelings of anger on the other hand are implied by physical acts of aggression (Palmer and Jankowiak, 1996). Performative acts of violence do not elicit evaluations of images that imply love or attraction; they are imagined and symbolically constructed as acts of hatred, revenge and anger. Acts of terrorism are therefore limited in what they can symbolically communicate to an audience through the performance of violence. Altheide (2004) notes that media coverage of the September 11 attacks demonstrated “simply the enemy’s dislike of the United States of America, its freedom and lifestyle. Indeed, anyone who suggested that the “cause” of the attacks was more complex and that the United States had angered many political groups by previous actions (e.g., support for Israel) was denounced” (p. 291).

The experiencing of imagery in performance limits the extent to which performative violence can symbolically communicate anything other than hatred, rage or anger. Terrorism therefore has a diminished capacity to control the ways in which the symbolic significance of the act is perceived: its performative power. The kinds of responses the act elicits are also limited by the accumulation of affects to the point that such responses become almost reflexive - even automated. Aly and Balnaves (2005) argue that public responses to terrorism are modulated by the political and media discourses that perpetuate public anxiety and elicit an affective response to fear embodied in the reinforcement and renewal of collective identity. Harindranath (2011) concurs, stating that the political battles over mediated images of terrorism affect public feelings of insecurity which are enacted through expressions of concern and suspicion about threatening ‘others’.

Terrorism conveys meaning by enacting images that are symbolically represented by tangible objects - buildings, trains and buses, schools, military bases - or people - soldiers, politicians, diplomats, civilians. The performative power of terrorism is derived when terrorists evoke imagery in their audiences that is interpreted by
audiences in the same way— that is when the symbolism and the interpretation are understood by both the terrorist and the public in ways that correspond. The symbolic significance of terrorism is vested in its capacity to appeal to vast collectives of people who have little knowledge of each other but who share in the spectacle of the event. Whether terrorists succeed in evoking interpretations in the minds of audiences that correspond to their symbolic meaning depends largely on the social and cultural contexts in which meaning is constructed and symbols become representative. Interpretations of terrorist acts are rarely unmediated and always transpire in context. Audiences of terrorism are not a monolithic collection of spectators, but interpret terrorism through cultural discourses, lived experiences and as members of social networks. A school may be a symbol of the lack of educational opportunity for the groups that terrorists claim to represent; but for the audiences that are agents in the interpretation of the terrorist performance, the school may be symbolically representative of innocence. Thus the imagery of the performance (in the mind of the performer/terrorist) is not connected to the imagery of the interpretation (in the mind of the interpreter/audience). Importantly, the imagery of the interpretation may, and often is, highly reliant on media and official discourses that modulate how audiences construct meaning from a terrorist act.

Studies on the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of communication consistently find that terrorism is a flawed communication strategy. Cordes (1978) for example argues that terrorists are poor communicators because their message lacks clarity. In order to be effective as a form of communication, terrorism relies on attention from the mass media. Violent acts of mass destruction are devised to attract significant media coverage to disseminate the intended message, yet they more often elicit media coverage that is counter-productive to the terrorist goal of publicising their cause. Media coverage of terrorist campaigns tend to ignore terrorist goals altogether, instead focussing on the destructive impacts of the act. Media coverage of the September 11 attacks focussed primarily on the rescue efforts, the victims, their families and on establishing the dominant themes through which the response to the attacks would be communicated and understood. An examination of studies on coverage of the September 11 attacks and the ensuing ‘war on terror’ in the United States media reveals some common themes: good versus evil; the evil ‘other’ is Islamic terrorism; Osama bin Laden personifies this evil; the West must battle evil and protect freedom and democracy (Erjavec & Volcic, 2007). Overwhelmingly these studies concur that the discourse of patriotism and collective identity was deployed to mobilise support for the official response to the attacks and to stifle any pluralist discussion on the possible motivations or cause for the attacks.

In Australia, the 2002 Bali Bombings were similarly constructed as an attack on freedom and liberty. In the media and official discourse on the Bali bombings, the attacks were framed as a direct attack on Australia and Australian values. The media and political discourse on the attacks drew on socially shared stereotypes of Australian values: larrikinism, laid back attitudes and a love of partying. The attacks were therefore interpreted as an enactment of hatred of these values (Aly 2010).

Much of the analysis of modern terrorism tends to construct the performative power of terrorism through its relationship with mass media. These analyses examine how terrorist attacks are orchestrated as media events— events that occur independently of the media but whose significance and scale are generated by the media (Dayan and Katz 1994; Weimann and Winn 1994), or how media coverage of terrorism influences public opinion and generates fear (Altheide 2004; Massumi 2005).

Jenkins (1974) describes terrorism as drama primarily directed at achieving
international attention in order to inspire fear. Writing at a time when terrorism first
took to the international stage with airline hijackings and hostage takings, Jenkins
noted the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the mass media, through
which terrorists were able to reach a broader audience by staging dramatic attacks.
Through the conceptual lens of symbolic communication Jenkins drew attention to the
terrorists’ audience stating that “The hostages themselves often mean nothing to the
terrorists. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not the actual victims. Terrorism
is theatre” (p. 4). Karber (1971) also noted that terrorists target their messages at
recipients other than the immediate victims. Writing specifically on hostage taking
incidents, Price (1977) considers both the immediate victims and spectators or
witnesses as targets of terrorist messages. He proposed three categories of audiences
to a hostage taking incident: the immediate victim (the hostage); the identification
group (those responsible for the welfare of the hostage); and the resonant mass (the
broader victim population). Two decades later, Weimann and Winn (1994) engaged
Jenkin’s notion of terrorism as theatre and applied it to an analysis that deconstructed
media oriented terrorism as a form of symbolic communication enacted through
violence.

The 2001 September 11 attacks on the United States reignited interest in the
symbolic dimensions of terrorism as performance with several analyses drawing on
the significance of the Twin Towers as symbols of American capitalism. Weimann
(2008) draws particular attention to the ways in which production requirements are
adopted in the orchestration of terrorism stating “Terrorists pay attention to script
preparation, cast selection, sets, props, role-playing, and minute-by-minute stage
management. Just like compelling stage plays or ballet performances, the media
orientation in terrorism requires full attention to detail to be effective.” (p. 71).

Bharucha (2014) argues that terrorism itself is not a performance, but that its
performativity lies in the responses to terrorism that give it meaning: spectatorship,
witnessing, engaging with media representations of spectacle and critical responses to
the media and discourses that evolve around the event. “The performance of terror, I
would emphasise, is built through the accretion of these responses, and not through
the act of terror itself” (p. 27). Several other scholars have explored responses to
terrorism through concepts of performance in order to emphasise agency and draw
attention to the ways in which diverse actors adopt performance roles, construct and
contest narratives about terrorism (Howie, 2013).

As Weimann (2008) notes, however terrorism and terror have always had a
performatve aspect, even before the advent of the mass media. Weimann cites the
example of the French Revolution where public executions by the guillotine were
used to spread fear. Earlier waves of terrorism such as the public assassinations of
symbolic figures carried out by the Sicarii in the first century AD and the martyr
operations of the Ismaïli- Nizaris centuries later were orchestrated campaigns of
violence that inspired both widespread fear and admiration without the media (Aly
2011). David Rapoport (1984) observes that the Ismaïli- Nizaris (or Assassins as they
are also known) “did not need mass media to reach interested audiences, because their
prominent victims were murdered in venerated sites and royal courts, usually on holy
days when many witnesses would be present.”

Writing on the performative history of terrorism, Kubiak (1991) makes the point
that notions of terrorism and theatre are not limited to analyses of what is often
described as the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media. According
to Kubiak such analyses assume that it is the relationship between terrorism and the
media that gives terrorism its performativity. Alternatively, Kubiak argues for a
conception of terrorism as “a natural extension of performative terror” (p.25), describing it as “an extreme, theatricalised violence” and cautions that “when terror’s roots and causes are represented in the formation of performance/media/theatre events, and the connections between the socialising, disciplining power of terroristic violence are cut-off from the ontologic terror which generates them- when terror loses itself in the Imaginary- we lose sight of terrorism’s mechanisms and are denied the possibilities of resistance” (p.20).

Kubiak’s assertion to look beyond the media representation in the analyses of performance and terrorism offers an opportunity to refocus attention on the responses to terrorism as opposed to the construction of terrorism as the locus of performativity. Notwithstanding the role of the media in influencing the ways in which terrorism is constructed and the ways in which witnessing and spectatorship are performed, there is more that can be said about the performative roles of diverse actors in constructing narratives (and counter narratives) about terrorism. That is to say, while acknowledging the communicative role of the media in terrorism, the ways in which victims and governments respond to acts of terrorism also have performative power. The performative power of counter terrorism responses, both through official channels and through civil society, is located in narratives that evolve around not just the media discourses of the event but also around the act itself.

The audience as performer: counter terrorism as performance

Performance and performativity offer an opportunity to examine the audiences that terrorism performs to and the performative acts that construct counter narratives to terrorism. Audience reception theory recognises that the messages embedded in a text (whether written or visual) are polysemic and interpreted differently by different audiences in different contexts. Importantly, reception theory (and the field of audience reception studies that it spawned) recognises that audiences are not latent receivers of messages but active agents in the construction of meaning (Hall, 1980). A significant contribution of audience reception theory is its ability to engage audience research with diverse fields of interest including the study of audiences as civic or political actors. Reception theory has also been applied to spectators of performative events, for example theatre audiences. In terms of terrorism, the concept of audience as actors in the reception (and production) of performance has predominantly focussed on how audiences construct media generated images of terrorism (see for example Aly, 2010). A consideration of reception theory in the analysis of performative acts of violence starts from acknowledging that terrorists are driven by the primary objective of influencing multiple audiences and that these audiences, individually and collectively, have agency in constructing narratives and counter narratives to terrorism. The convergence of performance theory extends this even further to a conceptual repertoire that examines how audiences contest the imagery of terrorism through performative acts. These performative acts include several levels ranging from the everyday and banal to public and private rituals of commemoration enacted on attack sites of symbolic significance. Attacks sites become theatres wherein terrorism and counter terrorism are performed through the enactment, expression and experience of imagery by a range of actors who construct and reconstruct meanings about terrorism and its responses; where these meanings may converge or diverge and where new meanings can be constructed, reconstructed and negotiated.
Terrorists perform with an audience or audiences in mind but can never really know the audience(s) upon whom they project their imagery. There is also no guarantee that the imagery they project corresponds with the imagery the audience perceives. The “contention over the imagery of an event depends on interpretive frameworks, and these may vacillate between several cultural and psychological domains, such as legal process, theatre, and personal responsibility” (Palmer & Jankowiak, 1996, p. 245). Audience members may also adopt performance roles and become performers in order to contest the performance imagery of terrorism. Performance roles that contest imagery are as much an enactment of imagery through symbolic expression and experience as the performance they challenge. When audiences perform acts that contest the imagery of terrorism they become narrators in the discourse- creating counter narratives that challenge the legitimacy, morality, truth, and appropriateness of the terrorist narrative. The contention over the imagery of terrorism is performed by two audience groups in related but distinct ways. One group is the governments who, through state driven counter measures, enact imagery about the meaning of terrorism that serve a national agenda. The other is the public who participate in symbolic acts that challenge the imagery of terrorism.

Just as terrorism derives its performative power in how it is perceived, so to counter terrorism (meaning here the vast array of responses to terrorism from official discourses to military action) is a performative act in so much as it also attempts, both directly and indirectly, to make a difference in how people perceive the world and, more specifically, in how people perceive the act of terrorism itself. By constructing the act of terrorism in a certain way over another, counter terrorism attempts to deconstruct and/or re-construct how terrorism is perceived in ways that serve an official or national agenda. What counter terrorism is- military action, social harmony, surveillance, security, foreign aid - is also what terrorism is- act of war, disruption, insecurity, social and economic inequality. Terrorism and counter terrorism are narrative and counter narrative, counter narrative and narrative- both contribute to the scripting of the performance.

De Graaf (2011) emphasises the importance of conceptualising counter terrorism as communicating a narrative. Describing counter terrorism as performativity, she states:

The way in which policymakers perform, or in other words carry out the process of countering terrorism, can have more impact than the actual arrests being made (or not being made). This is the so-called performativity of counter-terrorism or its performativity power. Performativity in this context indicates the extent to which a national government, by means of its official counter terrorism policy and corresponding discourse (in statements, enactments, measures and ministerial remarks), is successful in selling its representation of events and its set of solutions to the problem, as well as being able to set the tone for the overall discourse regarding terrorism and counterterrorism – thereby mobilising (different) audiences for its purposes. (p.3)

De Graaf’s analysis limits performativity to official discourses, strategies and actions of state driven counter terrorism. Conceptualising counter terrorism programs as performative acts that have the potential to create and sustain convincing counter narratives provides an opportunity to develop counter narratives that disrupt the emergence of terrorism supportive moral contexts and prevent exposure to these settings. However, community based and citizen driven responses are also part of the performativity of counter terrorism and a comprehensive account of the performative power of counter terrorism should also take these into account. At the official level,
counter terrorism is constructed and enacted in the interests of national security and international diplomacy. At the grass roots, community level, audiences become performers through acts that construct and communicate an imagery of terrorism that challenge the performance imagery of terrorism and, often, of state driven counter terrorism.

Public performances that contest the imagery of terrorism are enacted through a range of specific and symbolic acts. One example is the ‘Paddle for Peace’ ceremony held in Kuta beach Bali. The event, staged on the anniversary of the 2002 Bali bombings, sees hundreds of foreign and local surfers paddle out to sea and form a giant circle to perform prayers and offerings. ‘Paddle for Peace’ enacts the imagery of peace through shared understandings and experiences of peace - joining of hands, prayers, offerings. It communicates an imagining of terrorism as a threat to peace and peacefulness. The performative act of peace is constructed and enacted in contestation to the performative act of violence. Other kinds of rituals of remembrance and commemoration are also performative acts that are part of the terrorism/counter terrorism performance. How terrorism is remembered is not disjointed from how terrorism/ counter terrorism is imagined and perceived. While remembrance and collective memory have rarely been studied as part of the broader field of terrorism studies, how people choose to, are required to, or even demand to, remember acts of terrorism are part of the performativity of terrorism and counter terrorism. Contested meanings around terrorism/counter terrorism are played out on the sites of attacks that become platforms for much more than attempts to construct how the act is remembered and the victims memorialised. These sites become theatres for a battle of meanings about what terrorism is and conversely, what counter terrorism could be.

**Attack sites as theatres of performance**

The choice of attack site is central for communicating the symbolic significance of the terrorist act. As stated earlier, sometimes the symbolic significance is specific. When animal liberation groups firebomb an animal testing laboratory for example, the performative power of the act is heightened because the symbolic significance of the attack site is specific and the symbolic construction of the performance implies emotions of hatred or anger. The imagery projected by the act might communicate something like ‘we are angry at the use of animals for experimentation’. When terrorist groups attack sites with a social or cultural function, such as a nightclub, or infrastructure, such as public transport, the symbolic significance of the attack site is ambiguous but the symbolic construction of the performance implies the same emotions of hatred or anger. The performative power of terrorism is weakened because the imagery projected by the act communicates hatred or anger for no obvious, rational or specific reason other than ‘because they hate us’.

Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) refers to terrorist acts as both performative events - in the sense that they are symbolic; and performative acts - in the sense that they represent attempts to change something. The violent act of terrorism is not just about creating a spectacle - in particular international acts of terrorism performed on a world stage - but it is also perpetrated in the hope that the terrorists might indirectly or strategically make a difference in how their audiences perceive the world. For Juergensmeyer the performative power of terrorism is its symbolic significance, often communicated through the choice of attack site. In some cases such as the bombings of abortions clinics, the symbolic significance of the attack site is specific. In other examples, the sites symbolise the power and stability of the society being attacked and the destabilising capacity of terrorism: “Such central places- even if they exist
only in cyberspace- are symbols of power, and acts of terrorism claim them in a symbolic way. That is, they express for a moment the power of terrorist groups to control central locations- by damaging, terrorizing, and assaulting them-even when in fact most of the time they do not control them at all” (p. 134). While the site of the attack most often holds symbolic significance for both the terrorists and the societies in which these sites have a cultural or social function, the act of terrorism itself can also be more than symbolic “by demonstrating the vulnerability of the governmental power, to some degree it weakens that power. Because power is largely a matter of perception, symbolic statements can lead to real results” (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 135).

The symbolic significance of attack sites extends beyond their capacity to communicate something on behalf of the terrorists who assail and destroy them. Attack sites also hold symbolic significance for the governments, victims and the collectives that terrorist seek to influence and who also have something to communicate about the terrorist act itself. While attack sites are most commonly studied or analysed for their symbolic significance or tactical importance to the terrorists and prior to an attack, contested meanings interact, challenge and resolve in the narratives and counter narratives that are created around attack sites and their symbolic significance after the attack. Sturken (2007) has examined the ways in which New York’s Ground Zero has become a focal site for the generation of narratives and counter narratives about terrorism and its impacts produced through practices of memory and mourning. She argues that the narratives and meanings constructed around Ground Zero reveal a complex amalgamation of local and national agendas. The narratives produced at Ground Zero are constructed around the localised social, economic and cultural functions of the site both before and after its destruction. At the national level these narratives matter “when they are deployed in the service of national agendas, within a broader global context in which images of the United States are exported with political consequences” (p. 168).

Within the anthropological domain, attack sites have primarily been studied as sites of remembrance and ritual commemoration. But these practices are also part of the performativity of terrorism and, to reiterate Sturken’s (2007) point, also matter vis a vis the narratives and counter narratives they embody about terrorism and counter terrorism. Performance theory- the enactment and experience of imagery (Palmer and Jankowiak 1996)- offers a framework for understanding how audiences of terrorism, including the terrorists themselves, adopt performance roles and how attack sites become communicative platforms for the production of narratives and counter narratives about terrorism.

In 2003 the Bali bombings memorial was constructed at a busy intersection situated in between the former Paddy’s Bar and Sari Club. The memorial is in the form of a monument fashioned in traditional Balinese architectural style. The monument bears the names of the 202 victims of the bombings listed according to country and in no particular order. The inscriptions are entirely in the local language and pay tribute to those who lost their lives.

The 2002 Bali bombings had a severe economic impact on the island that had for decades relied on its reputation for harmony and tolerance to attract international tourists. The monument represents an attempt by the Indonesian and provincial Balinese governments to seek a pragmatic response to the Bali bombings enacted through motifs of economic recovery and the return of tourism. This response symbolised an imaging of the bombings as an attempt to dislodge the ‘Bali Harmony discourse’ within which “notions of hegemony, dispute, or discontent are treated as
aberrations, indeed risks, for the restoration of a sustainable progress. The social and cultural agonisms inevitably generated by Bali’s modernisation, increasing cosmopolitanism, and engagement with a globalising economy are played down.” (Lewis & Lewis 2008, p. 196).

The Bali monument creates an “authorized homology” that privileges a particular imagery of the terrorist event and imposes a homogenous memory and narrative. The homology produced by the monument “conceptualized the atrocity in terms of an official ideology and memory that would (re)synthesize the disparate parts of Indonesia that had succumbed to the force of global-local contentions and political violence” (Lewis et al, 2013, p.23). The authorized narrative of harmony and unification endorsed the national government’s agenda for security building as well as the local Balinese interests for economic recovery. Lewis et al (2013) have previously reported on a research project that examined the mechanisms that propagate counter narratives to the monument. Their research explored how visitors to the monument destabilize its homology through the ways in which they engaged with the monument and its surrounding space- taking holiday photographs, using the space as a meeting point and rejecting the monument’s “claim to universal value and reverence” (p. 31).

The remaining sections of this paper present a study on the Bali Peace Park, an attempt to build a commemorative park on the site of the 2002 Bali Bombings in Kuta. The case holds specific interest for exploring how performative acts of commemoration communicate different imaginings of terrorism that challenge official discourses of counter terrorism.

The Bali Peace Park Research Project
The Bali Peace Park is an initiative of the Australian based Bali Peace Park Association Incorporated (BPPAI). The BPPAI was established by victims and survivors of the two Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005. It seeks to establish a park on the site of former Sari Club where 202 people (including 88 Australians) died in the 2002 Bali bombings. The initiative was conceived sometime around the second anniversary of the Bali bombings when a group of Australian tourists discovered that the Sari Club site could be purchased. The Bali Peace Park Association has since been working towards achieving the goal of acquiring the land in order to build its vision of the Bali Peace Park. For at least eight years, the Association has been embroiled in a legal and political battle over the site. The 800 square metre tract of land in one of Bali’s most lucrative tourist districts is owned by a wealthy businessman unwilling to part with the block. Plans to develop the block into another nightclub site mobilised a movement to halt all re-building on the site. The Balinese government responded by issuing an embargo preventing any development of the site. Both Australian and local Balinese authorities have staked a position on the proposed Bali Peace Park. The park has bipartisan support from the Australian government and the local support of the Balinese Governor and community leaders.

The first of the Bali bombings was a suicide bomb at Paddy’s Bar. The explosion wreaked havoc and forced the patrons, dazed, confused and injured to flow out onto the street and into the nearby Sari Club. Minutes later, a second much more powerful vehicle borne explosive device ripped through the Sari Club and its surrounds. The site of the former Paddy’s Bar has since been rebuilt into a multi-storey night club. More than 11 years on from the Bali bombings, the Sari Club site stands abandoned. For many years it was neglected, overgrown with weeds and bordered by a damaged fence. In recent years it has served as a makeshift car park for the many cars and motorbikes unable to park on Kuta’s hectic streets. To the unaware, the site is
anonymous- its only relevance is as Kuta’s singular car park amid a sea of concrete and glass, constant traffic, loud music and raucous tourists making their way from one bar to the next. In fact the Sari Club site is the locus of an ongoing battle for meaning about the Bali bombings and their response.

A three year project funded by the Australian Research Council uses qualitative methods, including individual interviews and surveys to explore how individuals and communities engage with the proposed Bali Peace Park as a communicative platform for collectively resisting the social, cultural and economic impacts of terrorism through the enactment of contested imagery. Peace parks are defined as transboundary protected areas (Lejano, 2006) dedicated to conservation and the promotion of peace and cooperation between nations. They include themes of conflict resolution and cooperation between actors’, which can be nations, communities, agencies and other stakeholders, as well as individuals. Traditionally, peace parks were conceptualised as vehicles of conflict resolution and peace keeping between parties. Lejano (2006) distinguishes between two models of peace parks. The first model, conceptualised through game theory, revolves around conflict as space allocation and situates the peace park as a conflict free, neutral zone. This model emphasises the material functions of the peace park as a kind of buffer zone between parties in a territorial or ethnic dispute. The second model theorises peace parks as structures of care through which peace parks function as a bridge to cooperative activity. This model emphasises the social and cultural functions of the park as a medium for cooperative engagement that promotes peace through mutual understandings of self and identity. The primary function of the park is not derived from its physical site of no conflict but as a mechanism for relationship building. For the parties involved the park functions as a symbol and setting for newly-constructed collective identities that drive and define future activities. The Bali Peace Park offers a third model: park as counter-narrative. This model constructs the park as a communicative practice which develops collective narratives of resistance to terrorism and forms the basis for the research project.

The purpose of the project is to explore the ways in which the attack site is a locus for the performance and reception of the terrorist attack by examining the narratives and counter narratives that are enacted at the site. To examine the ways in which narratives have been generated by the Sari Club site and the proposed Bali Peace Park, the first phase of the research reported here employed a combination of methods including interviews, surveys and participant observation. The interviews were carried out with members of the Bali Peace Park Association, Australian and Balinese survivors of the 2002 Bali bombings and local Balinese supporters and detractors of the Peace Park. The surveys were conducted with visitors to the monument and Sari Club site in the days leading up to the 11th anniversary of the Bali bombings in October 2013. Participant observations provided further insights into the practices that are performed in and around the Sari Club site.

Contested imaginings and the performance of narrative on the Sari Club site

The research findings elucidate the various imaginings of the 2002 Bali bombings that continue to be enacted, expressed and experienced through the site of the Sari Club site where the opposing arguments to rebuild or remember signify a battle of meanings about the symbolic significance of the attacks. These meanings are embodied in the narratives generated by the performance roles of various actors- the Peace Park Association, survivors and victims of the bombings, visitors to the memorial sites, the local Balinese population- that challenge the performative power
of the terrorist attacks as well as that of the official responses to the attacks in three ways. Firstly, unofficial enactments of memory on the Sari Club site challenge the authorised Balinese response inscribed through official acts of memorialisation. These performative acts also challenge the perceived imagery of the terrorist attacks by constructing a counter narrative that personalises the victims through remembrance. Finally, the peace park represents an attempt to reinscribe the Australian official response to the Bali bombings that imagined the attacks as an assault on Western liberal values. The performance of narrative on the Sari Club site is not static and signifies the reinterpretation of individual and collective perceptions of the 2002 attacks.

**Challenging the official response through the performance of memory**

For victims (including family members) and survivors of the 2002 bombings, the Sari Club site is sacred land. At the site of the attacks families of victims and survivors defy the boundaries of authorised performativity inscribed in the official Bali monument and conduct their own form of ceremony within the site that now serves as a makeshift car park. In the days leading up to the anniversary, Australian flags and tributes begin to line the boundary fence of the Sari Club site, while the memorial remains untouched. It is not until the day of the anniversary that families of the victims engage in the authorised commemorative performance by placing their tributes at the memorial. For them, the site of the attack is more symbolically significant than the monument that stands just a few short steps away. On the day of the Anniversary, family members gather within the boundary fence of the former Sari Club site to light 88 candles - each representing an Australian victim of the bombings. The ritual has been performed every year since the first anniversary. Those who cannot make it to Bali, await the photographs confirming that their loved one too has been remembered on this day. When asked why they commemorate at the Sari Club and not the memorial, one family member responds: “That’s where it happened. That’s where she died. Not the memorial”.

The unofficial shrines and performances on the Sari Club site directly challenge the authorised homology of the monument which attempts to relocate the symbolic significance of the attacks and prescribe how and where performative acts of collective memory are performed. The monument invites a kind of passive engagement - one that is demarcated by its form and that is constantly challenged by the performers, be they locals using the monument as a meeting place or victim groups who persist in marking the symbolic significance of the Sari Club site.

In conducting unofficial performances of commemoration on the Sari Club site, victim groups construct a re-imagining of the Bali bombings vis a vis the symbolic significance of the attack site. Victims groups adopt performance roles that contest and challenge the authorised imaginings of the Bali bombings at one level and contest the imagery of terrorism enacted in the bombings at another level. The private and public performances of commemoration resituate and redefine the significance of the Sari Club site as the theatre of performance. They also redefine the social, economic and cultural functions of the site in much the same way as the practices of memory and mourning on 911’s Ground Zero did (Sturken 2007).

**Re-imagining the Bali bombings through the performance of memory**

Even in its stagnation, the Sari Club site is not a static receptacle but a space where contested narratives are constantly constructed and reconstructed. The debate over whether to rebuild or memorialise on the Sari Club site represents a clash between
two expressions of response: resistance versus remembrance. Do we resist terrorism by rebuilding (bigger and better) what was there before, thereby sending a message to terrorists that “we will not be influenced by violence”? If the Sari Club site remains unbuilt therefore preventing the development of another nightclub or tourist night spot, is this not the transformation that the terrorists were hoping to achieve? Or do we remember the atrocity of terrorism by commemorating those innocent people who lost their lives, thereby sending a message that “we will never forget”? These two forms are not entirely autonomous. They are inextricably linked to how terrorism is perceived as an indirect, strategic attempt to change something about how we view the world.

The research has found that to Australian and international visitors to the site, remembrance is the overwhelmingly preferred option. This should not be surprising considering that remembrance is attached to Western notions of cultural preservation. In the context of the Sari Club site and the existing Bali monument, the argument to incorporate a stable cultural form of memorial on the Sari Club site is more complex. In its current state as an empty lot, the Sari Club site does not prescribe a narrative about the attacks. That it exists as anything other than a car park is in the collective memory of those who were immediately impacted by the event. The majority of visitors to the monument are unaware of the significance of the empty site as the primary locale of the Bali bombings. Once they become aware, their responses are most markedly ones of emotional attachment: shock, disappointment and surprise.

The unofficial enactments of memory on the Sari Club site also challenge the perceived imagery of the terrorist attack by constructing a counter narrative that personalises the victims. Writing on the spontaneous shrines that emerged in and around the site of Ground Zero, Sturken (2007) argues that the individual practices of remembrance form a counter narrative to the spectacle of collective disaster created by the 9/11 attacks. The attacks were primarily designed to create a spectacle of imagery that became inscribed in the now familiar image of the collapsing towers. Such imagery, argues Sturken (2007), projects mass destruction and collective loss: de-individualising the victims and burying their identities in the mass of dust and rubble that blanketed the city: “Whereas the images of spectacle produced an image of collective loss, of a “mass body”, these rituals sought to speak of the dead as individuals. As such, these objects and messages attempted to resist the transformation of the individual identities of the victims into a collective subjectivity, and thus to resist the mass subjectivity of disaster” (Sturken, 2007, p. 178).

Santino (2006) observes that spontaneous shrines are in fact political in nature: a form of social commentary on issues of social or political significance: gun violence, AIDS, roadside deaths, domestic violence and terrorism. The acts of commemoration that are performed on the site of the Sari Club in Bali construct a counter narrative to terrorism by humanising the victims of terrorism and drawing attention to the devastation caused by violence. Santino describes this dynamic in the following paragraph:

It is said that in war a combatant is trained to depersonalize the enemy, to demonize the enemy in order to be able to kill that enemy with little or no remorse. Spontaneous shrines act in the opposite way. They perform the opposite task. They insist on the personal nature of the individuals involved in these issues and the ramifications of the actions of those addressed by the shrines... You are carrying out a holy war? You killed my father. Paramilitaries are killing people in the name of freedom? The IRA killed my wife. That’s not a
Taig or Prod - that’s my husband; my father; my brother. You are conducting wars against terrorism? You killed my mother; my sister; my daughter. Now. Defend your actions, your politics, in the light of that. (p. 13)

The communicative power of spontaneous or unofficial shrines and commemorations such as those on the site of the Sari Club is derived from performativity. By performing acts of private commemoration on the actual attack site of the Bali Bombings, the unofficial commemorations turn the attack site into the theatre of performance. They meet the terrorists on their own ground and communicate their resistance through rituals that humanise the victims. At the same time, they also resist the official discourse of commemoration: ‘This is where she died. She is not just a name on a plaque. She was my sister, my mother, my friend, and she was killed here.’ Through the performativity of memorialisation, remembrance becomes resistance: unofficial performances of memory do not just memorialise the victims of attacks; they enact an imagery that contests the imaginings of the terrorist attack and challenge its performative power.

Challenging the Australian discourse on the Bali bombings through the performance of memory

In the aftermath of international terrorist incidents in the US, Bali, Madrid and London, responses often suggested that a return to normality was a demonstration of resistance to terrorism. This kind of response mirrors the Western political rhetoric which constructs counterterrorism as a defence of democratic values and —our way of life, and translates collective resistance as the upholding of liberal democratic values. Consequently, during the 2000s, counter-narratives to terrorism were constructed as narratives that espoused the values of liberal democracy and rejected ideological influences that criticised the West.

The choice of Paddy’s Bar and the Sari Club as the attack site for the 2002 Bali bombings was perceived to be a symbolic statement of the terrorists’ opposition to Western values enacted through the targeted destruction of the site. A manuscript written by the Jemaah Islamiya ideologue, Ali Ghufron (aka Mukhlas), who received the death sentence for his part in organising the Bali bombing justifies the bombing as a religious and moral defence for the US led war in Afghanistan. The manuscript under emphasises the notion that Paddy’s Bar and the Sari Club were targeted because they were places of immorality. Yet the attacks were constructed as a protest against Western decadence and Australian values of freedom and liberty in the Australian media and political discourse and in the affective public responses to the attacks in Australia. Other attacks by JI on Australian interests in Indonesia include the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004. In contrast, the political and media construction of the embassy bombing did not emphasise the attack as an assault on Australian values. The point of difference between the ways in which these two acts of terrorism were contextualised is focussed on the attack site. Prior to its destruction, the Sari Club was well known among locals and visitors alike for its exclusivity. While tourists enjoyed free entry to the Club, locals and visiting Indonesians were charged an entry fee in a deliberate attempt by the Club’s owner to brand the Club as exclusively Western. The choice of the Sari Club as an attack site enacted an imagery of terrorism that was interpreted as anger over what the Sari Club symbolised: Western decadence and the pollution of Indonesian moral values.

For Australians, the affective public response to the bombings was enacted through motifs of national pride that symbolised an imagining of the bombings as an attempt to destroy the very foundations of the modern nation state (see Lewis 2006). The first
commemoration of the bombings in 2003 was used by the Australian government as a platform to garner national support for its involvement in the “war on terror”: “Australia was able to “imagine” the memorial space [of the 2002 Bali bombings] as a site of reverence and remembrance, a place in which the holy force of the war on terror could be articulated as a transnational, ideological, and even cosmological mission” (Lewis et al, 2013, p.32).

As previously mentioned peace parks are traditionally defined as trans-boundary buffer zones between parties in a conflict. As such, the proposed Bali Peace Park is not so much a peace park as it is a park for peace. The concept of the Bali Peace Park has necessarily evolved to negotiate both Balinese and Australian responses to the attacks in order to garner necessary political and local support for its construction. Local reception of the proposed park among the Balinese is fragmented in much the same way as it was to the Bali Bombings Monument. Contentions over the meaning of the site for the Balinese are embroiled in local traditions of culture that inscribe certain ways of dealing with cycles of life and death. The body of work by Lewis and his colleagues (2006, 2008, 2013) elucidates the disparity between local community, national and transnational narratives that were enacted in the aftermath of the Bali bombings. For the local Balinese, the Western notion of commemoration is at odds with the traditional Hindu concepts of history and memory enacted through cleansing and interfaith rituals to restore the delicate cosmological balance between good and evil (see Lewis 2006, Lewis & Lewis 2008, Lewis et al 2013).

While the Bali Peace Park Association has been cautious not to describe the proposed park as a memorial, media reports invariably describe it as a memorial park to honour the bomb victims. The design of the park and its proposed elements certainly lend themselves to such a description. The most recent plans for the Bali Peace Park released in 2013 describe it as a spiritual garden “a site for people to reflect and acknowledge the terrorist attack on October 12 2002” (Bali Peace Park Association) and incorporate a sculpture featuring 202 poles that represent the lives lost in the 2002 terror attack, a garden wall featuring the names of the victims and multi-faith contemplative corners. Like the Bali monument, the proposed park inscribes a certain imagery of the terrorist attacks conceptualised in terms of an attack on universal values of peace and harmony. Through a counter narrative of peace, the Bali Peace Park attempts to reconstruct the symbolic significance of the Sari Club site from a site that represents the terrorists’ abhorrence of Western decadence to a site that “turn[s] the memories of this place into a sense of respect for the deceased and of hope for peace in the future” (Nurhayati, 2013). In this way it challenges the official and popular Australian construction of the attacks as an assault on Australian values of freedom and democracy.

The peace park also represents an attempt to reinscribe the Sari Club site from a sacred space for performative acts of private commemoration to a public commemoration space. Steele (2006) argues that the permeation of Western project of memory into non-Western locales has resulted in the evolution of memorialisation to an aesthetic expansion of international politics: a politicised rite and ritual for international society. In its barren state the Sari Club site is a site of memory only to those who have a personal connection with it- the survivors and families of victims who perform the annual rituals of memory and erect unofficial shrines. The Bali Peace Park research project found that an overwhelming majority of visitors to Kuta during the anniversary of the Bali Bombings knew nothing of the Sari Club site or its significance. Most assumed that the Bali monument was built on the site of the attacks and participated in the authorised practices of memorialisation under this assumption.
The proposed Bali Peace Park attempts to relocate the site of memory to the Sari Club site and in doing so to reshape memory and produce narratives of a socio-political perception of the terrorist event as an attack on universal values of peace. In doing so it attempts to transform the Sari Club site into a locale for public performances that contest the imagery of terrorism. The collective acts of memorialisation on the site of the proposed park enact an imagery of peace through shared understandings and experiences of memorial- reflection, prayer and paying homage to victims. These acts communicate an imagining of terrorism as a threat to future peace and peacefulness in contrast to the political construction of terrorism as a threat to Australian values and the modern nation state.

Conclusion

The performative power of terrorism relies on the capacity of a terrorist attack to symbolically convey meanings to audiences that align with the meanings that the perpetrators wish to convey. Through violence, terrorist performers enact an imagery of the world that attempts to change how their audiences view the world. The performativity of violence is limited by the very act of violence which elicits responses vested in emotional experiences of anger, hatred and rage. The choice of attack site plays a central role in constructing the symbolic significance of a violent attack. International attacks of terrorism are designed to attract widespread attention from multiple and diverse audiences. The way the attack is perceived, interpreted and constructed often relies on symbolic significance of the attack target in both the minds of the terrorist perpetrators and their audiences. While attack sites are generally of interest because of their symbolic significance to terrorists, very little attention has been paid within terrorism studies to the symbolic significance of attack sites after an attack. Attack sites become theatres of performance that invite actors to enact images that contest the imagery of the terrorist attack. These kinds of performances; unauthorised shrines and commemorations often enacted by victims, survivors and families, also have a performative power through the construction of counter narratives. Performance and performativity accommodate frameworks for appraising and evaluating the contribution of civic acts of counter terrorism as well as official counter terrorism. It does this by enabling collective activism to be seen as part of a broader performance where the performative act of violence creates a space for diverse actors to enact images that contest the symbolic significance of violence and challenge its performative power.

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