We want to challenge Lee and Williams' assertion that "the emotional dimension of the experience of completing a PhD" risks further marginalisation "in the current climate of emphasis on rationalisation and reform for graduate training" (7), by suggesting another possibility - that the emotions themselves are now being foregrounded as ripe for recuperation within the very rationalising logic Lee and Williams draw critical attention to. Far from ignoring the emotions, academic managers are now having their attention drawn to the importance of emotions by the non-traditional "management guru" texts which are increasingly their main source of information. Emotions are in.

We are not suggesting that there is any joy in this for the current generation of PhD supervisors and their students. What we are saying is that new knowledge objects like "emotional literacy" make it possible for critiques like "Forged in Fire..." to be speedily recuperated into the very "improvement imperative" which Lee and Williams seek to question. Thus our concern is not that PhD trauma is being increasingly marginalised, but that it is now able to be misrecognised as a skill deficit on the part of supervisors and/or students; evidence of "low emotional intelligence" rather than a production of postgraduate pedagogical relations in a particular sort of academy. As a skill deficit, such trauma is likely to be "remediated" by training in the proper way to be emotional. This training is currently being provided in universities by human resource managers, staff developers and consulting psychologists whose job it is to reinscribe academics and academic managers as active, enterprising human resources. The call is not to rationality but to the right sort of irrationality.

I Engaging the emotions

Present calls for the pedagogical and administrative transformation of Australia’s universities make it clear that what universities need is radical departure from the traditional university as a regime of governance. Paul Ramsden’s work ("Out of the Wilderness," Learning to Lead) is a highly influential exemplar of this sort of advocacy. To make his case, Ramsden draws on the significant and influential knowledge production of so-called "academic gurus" such as Charles Handy, Rosabeth Moss Kanter,
The Taming of Trauma

and Michael Porter, and "consultant gurus" such as Tom Peters, Stephen Covey, and Peter Drucker (Huczynski). As significant players in the management-fashion-setting community, these people not only distribute their ideas through management texts, but are also often highly successful orators who specialise in persuasive communication (Clark & Salaman).

The elaboration of any "new vision" may be expected to entail the denunciation of traditionally accepted current forms of organisation. New wave management theorists of the 1980s (who include Peters and Waterman; Naisbitt; Peters; Naisbitt & Aburdenne) shift the emphasis from bureaucratic to entrepreneurial and intrapreneurial styles of management, that is, "from reactive to proactive" (du Gay 47; Moss Kanter) engagement. The effect is that universities are now understood to be workplaces where client-driven activity rather than passivity is the norm. This notion of enterprise that floods the excellence and quality literature is strongly linked to how the individual should act at an ethical level (Gordon 48). Individual citizens are constituted as "desiring" the opportunity to participate in this way, thereby realising their "true" selves. Importantly for our argument here, the literature argues for a "balance" of the rational and the emotional. As Peters and Waterman argue, "we have to stop overdoing things on the rational side" (407). This incitement to disorder is an important step in putting the irrational to work.

Activity, passion, and self-fulfilment are the hallmarks of all workers in the 1990s, including PhD supervisors and their "clients." Peters, for example, lists eight characteristics of the leader "living" the vision, including "being inspiring" and being a "beacon and control." He completes the list by insisting that "another part of living the vision is pure emotion" (407). This insistence on blurring the rational/emotional distinction suggests new directions for management knowledge, including the management knowledge which is driving policy in Australian universities. As universities look more like businesses, those hallmarks of excellence in business management ought to be reflected, so the argument goes, in university life. According to Peters and Waterman:

[B]usinesses are full (100 percent) of highly 'irrational', (by left brain standards), emotional human beings: people who want desperately to be on winning teams ('seek transcendence'); individuals who thrive on the camaraderie of an effective small group or unit setting ('avoid isolation'); creatures who want to be made to feel that they are in at least partial control of their destinies. (60; also cited in Rose 115)

What Lee and Williams do need to take account of, then, is that universities are under pressure to take advantage of the "emotional, more primitive side (good and bad) of human nature" (Peters and Waterman 60, our italics), if they are to count as "excellent" business organisations. The valorisation of this emotional side is, of course, contained within the logic in such a way that it can still be managed, or, as Peters and Waterman put it, "[a]ll that stuff you have been dismissing for so long as intractable, irrational, intuitive, informal organisation can be managed" (11). That
this logic may not yet have fully impacted on the PhD is a matter which
is being remedied by academic managers as we write.

The Peters and Waterman analysis overlaps with the multiplicity of
gendered binary formulations which have been scrutinised in feminist
analyses of social life. These include hard/soft, rational/emotional, in-
dependent/nurturing, strategic/spontaneous, and competitive/co-op-
erative (Morgan 179) and, more recently, controllable/intractable (Calas
& Smircich; Haraway; Grosz). While it could be argued that, in the 1980s,
the discourse of feminism and management had maintained a comfort-
able distance, the mobilisation of this knowledge in the 1990s has pro-
duced the possibility of arguing that the soft skills are harder to master
than the hard skills such as the technical ones.

Cognitive psychologists have also played a key role in recuperating
the emotions. Those psychologists whose interests are in brain laterality
and personality functioning have provided new categorisations of hu-
man action for inscribing the shifting boundaries of permissible action
for the effective employee. In this discourse, the "affective" domain, with
"right-brain" functioning and emotional responses, becomes a legitimate
part of the organisational worker (Peters & Waterman 59-61). The in-
scription of the right brain/left brain as responsible for "holistic, intuitive,
empathetic processes" in contrast with "logical, analytical proc-
esses" (Limerick & Cunnington 139), provides a certain legitimacy for
actions previously framed as outside the professional field, and inap-
propriate to it. When the rationality/emotion binary is reworked as com-
plementary in this way, emotional responses are subsumed within
a rational framework, rather than remaining the antithesis of rationality.

Refusing any separation of the emotional/logical and the personal/
pubic allows a powerful new source of energy and motivation - and
new types of practices - to become possible in university life as in any
other corporate existence. This move achieves a novel linkage between
the economic imperatives of the organisation and the personal objectives
of the individual. The domain of therapeutic expertise, with its techniques
for managing the happiness of employees, can and is being mobilised in
this framework, as culture, the personal, and the economic are collapsed
in a new way. No longer is the facilitation of "belonging" the focus of
emotional life, as it was in the 1970s and 1980s through the Human Re-
lations movement. The emotions themselves are quite precisely linked
to entrepreneurialism, which in universities, is being linked in turn with
research and/or consultancy.

II EQ not IQ

Given this recuperation of the emotions within rationality itself, it is little
wonder that "emotional literacy" is making an appearance in lists of ge-
neric attributes that ought to be possessed by academics and university
graduates alike. We want to examine the knowledge object "emotional literacy" more closely before considering critiques that can and have been made of this idea in the context of the gendered nature of academic work.

"Emotional literacy" is one of the qualities that our own university has named as a generic attribute to be fostered in its graduates. This term denotes a call to "expressiveness," which is framed as a social art in pseudo-academic motivational texts such as Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ. In Goleman's work, the individual is directed to the art of expressiveness through interpersonal relationships as the proper means through which to become "more fully human" (Goleman 45); however the call to expressiveness does more than this. Goleman argues that the behaviours through which one expresses oneself can be taken as a measure of an individual's "emotional literacy" (341), and as such they can be evaluated, taught and learned. Moreover, Goleman argues, this measurement ("EQ") is a much more reliable measure than intellect (IQ) of an individual child's future success.

One manifestation of EQ, according to Goleman, is "the degree of emotional rapport" between individuals, and the ability of one individual to orchestrate this rapport when engaging with another. Such an orchestration, if done correctly, produces "synchrony" and this "facilitates the sending and receiving of [proper] moods" (116). Goleman elaborates with reference to the teacher/learner relationship:

The synchrony between teachers and students indicates how much rapport they feel; studies in classrooms show that the closer the movement co-ordination between teacher and student, the more they felt friendly, happy, enthusiastic, interested, and easygoing while interacting. In general the high level of synchrony in an interaction means the people involved like each other. Frank Bernieri, the Oregon State University psychologist who did these studies, told me, "How awkward or comfortable you feel with someone is at some level physical. You have to have compatible timing, to coordinate your movements, to feel comfortable. Synchrony reflects the depth of engagement between the partners; if you're highly engaged, your moods begin to mesh, whether positive or negative." (116-117)

To understand relationships this way is to understand them as produced by means of precise, learnable social skills (eg, a talent for rapport, the ability to delay gratification) which foster and preserve relationships (118) while keeping the individual focused on goals. These skills ought to be observable in the daily interaction of teachers and students if they are part of "communities that care" (279).

In the light of this reasoning, the traumatised PhD candidate becomes available to be framed either as the product of a supervisor with a low EQ, or as an individual who does not have sufficient emotional skill to delay gratification - or both. Importantly, the idea that the traumatised subject is "a necessary condition and an effect of the production of the subject of doctoral study" (Lee and Williams 8) is made unthinkable by this logic.
There is now a growing body of work which draws attention to the problems associated with the "products" of EQ. A number of critics (for example, Hatcher; Dewhurst; Boler) argue that the idea of emotion as a subset of cognition works to tame alien elements of human being which have proved resistant to the sort of governance that is necessary to the individual as an active and enterprising member of a multinational, globalised workplace. In "Capitalising on Emotion: The Taming of the EQ Alien," Megan Boler argues that the concept of emotional intelligence reappropriates a long-standing feminist terrain of interest in the other-than-cognitive - in what stands outside reason - and does so in ways that are closely aligned with the needs of global capital. She writes:

[B]Profit from human capital relies more and more on an interpersonal dynamic that fuels smooth and efficient production within virtual communities. Isolation is no longer the name of the game. Those individuals most capable of creating friendly and trusting networks for information and gossip are the most valuable workers. The workers of the future are being prepared with curriculum in 'emotional literacy' in hundreds of public schools in the United States.... It is a very short jump from teaching literacy to teaching morals.... We face the seemingly perennial postmodern question: who gets to decide what counts as the good citizen, and specifically the appropriate emotional response? (16-18)

Boler notes the speed with which the concept of emotional literacy has been taken up by the popular media. She draws attention to "the 1995 spectacle of 'EQ' pasted on the cover of Time magazine," "the quick sale to Oprah Winfrey and national Public Radio" in the United States, and "the ability of Goleman's book to hold onto its best-seller status for months" (2), as indications that "Western consumers are...hungry for this sudden reversal of a very dominant binary" (2). As Boler sees it, Goleman offers "a popularised rendition of the battle between genes and self-control...claim[ing] new status for emotions as themselves intelligent" (2), and in so doing recuperates potentially "alien" elements of social interaction. "The hero" of Goleman's thesis, she argues, "is not in fact 'emotion' but the ability to control emotion" (3). It is the display of coolness, of dis/passion, of clear thinking, which characterises the "emotionally intelligent" individual.

Academics are very suspect in this new version of intelligence. It is interesting to note how many of Goleman's examples of the "social incompetent" are intellectuals of one sort or another. For example:

There was no doubt Cecil was bright, he was a college-trained expert in foreign languages, superb at translating. But there were crucial ways in which he was completely inept. Cecil seemed to lack the simplest social skills. He would muffle a casual conversation over coffee, and fumble when having to pass the time of day: in short, he seemed incapable of the most routine social exchange.
Because his lack of social grace was most profound when he was around women, Cecil came to therapy wondering if perhaps he had "homosexual tendencies of an underlying nature". (120) Goleman names "Cecil" as suffering from a psychological condition called dyssemia, a "learning disability in the realm of non-verbal messages," which "affects about one in ten children." A teacher in a "good" teaching/learning relationship would be unlikely to be a sufferer. However, those teachers for whom subject expertise or research is all are rendered much more suspect. High intellect is as suspect as eccentricity, when the two are conflated in this way. A teacher’s passion for their disciplinary knowledge could well threaten "quality" relationships by distracting her from the main game. And the main game is not (intellectual) brilliance but "emotional brilliance" (126).

Here we think is where the rubber of "new management imperatives" meets the road of PhD credentialling. It is interesting to note how this reworks Lee and Williams’ question about the possible usefulness of the professional doctorate. They ask "would alternative forms of training such as professional doctorates... overcome the emotional distress of doctoral training?" (23). Our work leads us to a different question: To what extent should the collision of the high rationality of the PhD with the new management imperative to emotional literacy be "resolved" by the professional doctorate? If it is to be a space for the production of a different kind of "pragmatic" work-centred research, what might be the effects of its discursive organisation, for better and worse?

In the meantime, those of us who are supervisors need to keep a careful check on our own EQ. If it is high, we will be influential, and in influencing, we exercise power, power that works as a "deep and intimate" dominance which leads to confluence, to synchrony of teacher and learner. As Goleman argues:

Setting the emotional tone of an interaction is, in a sense, a sign of dominance at a deep and intimate level; it means driving the emotional state of the other person... When it comes to personal encounters, the person who has the most forceful expressivity - or the most power - is typically the one whose emotions entrain the other. That is what we mean by "He had them in the palm of his hand." Emotional entrainment is at the heart of influence. (117)

"Having the students in the palm of your hand" recasts the teacher/student relationship as a hierarchy of influencer and influencee, and in doing so, recasts the teacher/student relationship as synonymous with service provider and client. When academics understand students at all levels as not simply learners but paying recipients of their professional services, the nature of the relationship and the entities within it are bound to change. The implication here is that trauma is a clear signal that the teacher/supervisor has not achieved synchrony with the PhD candidate, a "lack" which indicates the need for more professional development in counselling and conflict resolution. While we do not wish trauma on any of our PhD students, we are no less concerned about the "solutions" being
offered by the human resource management team who have only our wellbeing at heart.

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